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THE IMPACT OF THE 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST ON SECTION 103(1)
CHAPTER A: INTRODUCTION
THE MEANING OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE CONCEPT DISTINGUISHED
FROM TAX EVASION AND SHAM TRANSACTIONS
Tax evasion is and has always been an illegal activity and subject to heavy penalties. It is
the situation where a taxpayer consciously tries to shrink the payment of a tax liability by
fraudulent or devious means. In other words, by falsifying his returns or books, by not
rendering returns etcetera.
Tax avoidance, on the other hand, is the refining or escaping from or the preventing of a
tax liability. In other words, it is the organising of the taxpayer's affairs to reduce the tax
payable before it has been imposed.
Lord Tomlin succinctly defined avoidance in the English case of Duke of Westminster v
IRe as follows: l
'Every man is entitled, if he can, to organise his affairs so that the tax attaching
under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in
organising them as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the
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Commissioners for Wand Revenue or his fellow-taxpayers may be of his ingenuity,
he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.'
Much South African case law and academic pronouncements have supported this
statement, and tax avoidance continues as a basis of tax planning.
The taxpayer, however, is not entirely at liberty to order his affairs legally so that he
remains immune from tax. The Income Tax Act contains a general provision,
Page 2
section 103(1), specifically designed to counter tax avoidance schemes. If the
requirements of this section are fulfilled, the taxpayer may be taxed as if he had never
entered into the particular scheme designed to avoid tax. The transaction remains legally
valid and enforceable between the parties to it, but is ignored for tax purposes.2
This must be distinguished from the case of 'disguised' or 'sham' transactions, which the
courts, in terms of common law, are entitled to disregard, giving effect to the true nature
of the transaction. In these cases it is unnecessary to resort to statutory provisions, for
example, section 103(1). This type of transaction is one where the taxpayer uses some
fictitious device which cannot give rise to the normal rights and duties of a valid
transaction, and which attempts to hide its real purpose. A 'sham' transaction is different
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to a valid transaction that has been entered into for improper purposes, which might fall
foul of section 103(1).
THE LEGISLATION
Section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act, as amended, reads as follows: 3
'Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, operation or scheme
(whether entered into or carried out before or after the commencement of this Act,
and including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of
property) -
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or
postponing liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this
Act or any previous Income Tax Act, or of reducing the amount thereof; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or
scheme was entered into or carried out -
(i) was entered into or carried out-
(aa) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the
The 1996 amendments are shown in italics, and come into effect on promulgation ofthe Income Tax Act 36 of
1996,3 July 1996; and apply to any transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out on or after that
date. The provisions ofsection 103 will, however, in relation to any transaction, operation or scheme entered into
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context of business, in a manner which would not normally
be employed for bona fide business purposes, other than the
obtaining ofa tax benefit; and
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme,
being a transaction, operation or scheme not falling within
the provisions of item (aa) by means or in a manner which
would not normally be employed in the entering into or
carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;
or
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or
scheme in question; and
(c) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of obtaining
a tax benefit.
the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by
this Act, and the amount thereof, as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not
been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the
case he deems appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance,
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A definition of a 'tax benefit' has been introduced in a new subsection (7), which reads as
follows:
'For the purpose of subsection (i) "tax benefit" includes any avoidance,
postponement or reduction of liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed
by this Act or any other law administered by the Commissioner.'
The introduction of the definition of a 'tax benefit' seems to have little impact, the main
thrust of the amendments being to better equip the Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service in attacking 'business' transactions that are structured in a manner that
avoids taxation.
THE REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET BEFORE SECTION 103(1) CAN BE
INVOKED
From the above it can be seen that section 103(1) contains four key requirements which
must all be present before the anti-avoidance provisions can be invoked.4 Briefly, the
requirements are:











a transaction, operation or scheme;5
ul . 6a res tant tax saVIng;
tax avoidance as a sole or main purpose;7
abnormality.8
The first three requirements are now dealt with.
Transaction, operation or scheme
There has been little dispute over the meaning of these words in the courts. Because they
are framed so broadly, the Commissioner has little difficulty in bringing almost any
arrangement into their scope.
After referring to arrangements made by the taxpayer in Meyerowitz v CIR, Beyer JA
agreed with the judgment of the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals in which
Watermeyer J said the following: 9
5 The opening portion ofsection 103(1).
6 Section 103(l)(a).
7 Section 103(I)(c) and the definition of 'tax benefit'.
8 Section 103(l)(b).
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'The word "scheme" is a wide term and I think that there can be little doubt that it is
sufficiently wide to cover a series of transactions . . . .'
A resultant tax saving
The phrase 'effect of avoiding or postponing liability' was interpreted in the case of Smith
v CIR, 10 where Steyn Cl, after rejecting an earlier interpretation given in the case of CIR v
King,lI applied the literal rule of interpretation and said the following at 12:
'The ordinary natural meaning of avoiding liability for a tax on income is to get out
of the way of, escape or prevent an anticipated liability.'
These two requirements can easily be proved by the Commissioner, and are seldom in
dispute. The final two requirements are the ones on which most case law hinges.
Tax avoidance as a sole or main purpose
In determining 'purpose', the courts have held that the test is a subjective one and that
10 1964 (1) SA324 (A), 26 SATC 1.
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because a transaction has the effect of avoiding tax, it does not necessarily mean that this
was its purpose.12
Although the courts have indicated that a tax avoidance 'effect' should not cloud their
judgment as to 'purpose', section 103(4) states that once the 'result', that is the 'effect', of
a scheme is to avoid tax, it is presumed, until the contrary is proved by the taxpayer, that
the main 'purpose' was to avoid tax.
This means effectively that the taxpayer has to show that his dominant purpose was some
non-tax purpose, as was done successfully in SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert13 and
CIR v Louw, 14 as far as incorporation was concerned.
12 See in this regard SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 (A), 40 SATC 39 at 48.
13 1971 (3) SA 567 (A), 33 SATC 113.
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF mE REPORT
The discussion which follows centres on the 'abnormality' requirement and whether the
introduction of the 'business purpose' test creates any significant impact, and whether in
essence, the intention of the amendments is to look at the substance of the transaction, or
series of interrelated transactions, rather than the simple form - a view which has already
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CHAPTER B : NORMALITY
Section 103(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, as amended, reads as follows: 15
'having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or
scheme was entered into or carried out -
(i) was entered into or carried out-
(aa) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the context of
business, in a manner which would not normally be employed for
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit;
and
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme, being a
transaction, operation or scheme not falling within the provisions of
item (aa) by means or in a manner which would not normally be
employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or
scheme in questioIS or
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or
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scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question. '
INTERPRETATION OF THE SECTION BEFORE THE 1996 AMENDMENT
(INCORPORATING A HISTORY OF mE AMENDMENTS)
The test of normality was probably introduced into section 103 as a result of the remarks
of Schreiner JA in CIR v King where he said the following: 16
'The section is not, in my opinion, designed to implement the expectations, however
reasonable, of the Commissioner that there will be no change in the taxpayer's affairs
which will result in hinI getting less income; it is designed to meet the
Commissioner's objections to the creation of abnormal or unnatural situations to the
detriment of the fiscus. Now normally and naturally the owner of an income-
producing asset receives the income and the labourer receives the reward of his
labour. Any departure from this order of things, if done with the object of
prejudicing the fiscus, is the subject of a legitimate objection by the Commissioner,
which is met by the machinery of the section. '
(Emphasis added.)
16 1947 (2) SA 196 (A), 14 SATC 184 at 199. The facts ofthe case were basically that King entered into an
agreement whereby he sold certain shares in private companies to his child. In assessing King the Commissioner
had, in terms ofsection 90 (now section 103), disregarded the agreement, and taxed the dividend in the hands of
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Over the years the section has been refined in a number of ways with the latest amendment
introducing the so-called business purpose test which will be dealt with in greater detail
further on.
PARTIES DEALING AT ARM'S LENGTH
Dealing with the legislation before the introduction of the 'business purpose' test.
The approach to the nonnality or otherwise of a transaction was dealt with by the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Hick/in v SIR. 17 This case involved a so-
called dividend stripping operation. The shareholders of a dormant company sold their
shares to a purchaser at a price equal to the net asset value less a percentage thereof. Once
the dividend stripper had obtained control of the dormant company, it declared the
distributable reserves as a dividend (to itself) and thereafter deregistered the company.
Because the dividend stripper was a company, and therefore not liable for tax on the
dividend, the Commissioner applied section 103Cl) and taxed Hicklin and his co-
shareholders on the dividend (which at that stage, being natural persons, was taxable in
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their hands),
In his judgment Trollip lA stated the following about section I03(l)(b):18
'A few preliminary observations about paras (i) and (ii) of the subsection. When the
"transaction, operation or scheme" is an agreement, as in the present case, it is
important, I think, to determine first whether it was one concluded "at arm's
length ", That is the criterion postulated in para (ii), For "dealing at arm's length"
is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry. It
connotes that each party is independent of the other and, in so dealing, will strive to
get the utmost possible advantage of the transaction for himself. Indeed in the
Afrikaans text the corresponding phrase is "die uiterste voorwaardes beding".
Hence, in an arm's length agreement the rights and obligations it creates are more
likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).
And the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also
more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i). The next
observation is that, when considering the abnormality of the rights and obligations so
created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the
surrounding circumstances. Section 103(1) itself postulates that. Thus, what may
be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or
carrying out of an agreement in one case may be abnormal in an agreement of the
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same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances. The last
observation is that the problem ofnormality or abnormality in such matters is mainly
a factual one. The court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of
the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence
produced therein by either party. '
(Emphasis added.)
The court held that the agreement between the dividend stripper and the shareholders was
an arm's length transaction in which each party was striving to obtain the maximum
possible advantage for himself. For this reason the abnormality requirement was not
satisfied and section 103(1) was therefore not applicable.
From this case it can be concluded that if there is an arm's length transaction it will be
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PARTIES NOT DEALING AT ARM'S LENGm
The concept ofparties not dealing at ann's length was dealt with in CIR v LOUW. 19 In this
case a civil engineering partnership was incorporated by means of the sale of the business
from the partnership to a newly fonned company. The shareholders and directors of this
company were the partners in the partnership.
The features that the Commissioner contended were 'abnormal' were the following:
• The sale of the assets of the partnership to the company on credit without requiring
the payment of interest.
• The provision of payment of the credit loans when the purchaser's financial
circumstances permitted.
• And the conclusion of service contracts between the company and its shareholders
(the erstwhile partners) in tenns of which no set remuneration was stipulated and the
fact that the respondent received a salary which was much smaller than the income
which accrued to him for performing the same services while the partnership existed.
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Corbett lA, after quoting from Geustyn's case20 the passage that the court was ex
hypothesi concerned with partners who have made over their practice, not to an
independent third party but to a company of which they are the sole shareholders and
directors, went on to say the following: 21
'In such a case should the Court, in applying the "nonnality" yardstick, take account
of the special relationship between the erstwhile partners and the company which
they have fonned, or ignore it and apply the yardstick as though the company were a
stranger? I do not see how the court can ignore the special relationship and yet give
proper effect to the concluding words of section 103(1), viz. "under a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in
question ..." (My italics.) For it is of the very nature of the incOIporation scheme
that the company to which the practice is sold by the partners will have as
shareholders and directors the self-same partners and will be controlled by them.
Those are the realities of the situation. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that in a
case such as the present the transaction is a multipartite one to which all the partners
and the company are parties; and each partner's contracts both with the company and
his fellow partners and seeks to extract from the transaction the best advantage for
himself. (Here I might point out that this case differs from Hicklin's case supra in
that there the Court was considering (see 494H - 495F) an agreement which was
20 The facts ofthis case are similar to those ofLouw, however, the Geustyn case was decided on the basis that the
avoidance oftax was not the sole or main purpose ofthe incorporation, and therefore the issue of abnormality was
not addressed in detail.
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entered into by parties dealing with one another at ann's length and the remarks of
Trollip JA, particularly at the top of 495, must be read in light ofthat fact. 22)
'With this in mind, it does not seem to me that the features stressed by the
appellant's counsel constitute the creation of abnormal rights or obligations. As to
the arrangement that the payment of the purchase price was to be made only as and
when the company was in a financial position to do so, there is little else that the
parties could have done. Initially the company had very limited capital and the idea
was that it would payoff the purchase price out of profits. That it proceeded to do
over a period of five to six years. Since the sellers were the persons mainly
instrumental in earning those profits and were in complete control over the company,
it was a perfectly sound and businesslike arrangement. It was not an arrangement
which would not normally have been created by persons dealing at ann's length in
this type of transaction. The same goes for the non-payment of interest on the
purchase price. The non-payment of interest increased the profits of the company;
and this directly benefited the erstwhile partners as the shareholders in the company
for it enabled the company to pay off the purchase price more rapidly. Likewise, in
the particular circumstances, there was, in my view, no abnormality in the fact that
the erstwhile partners gave their services to the company for no previously stipulated
salaries. As controllers of the company they were able from year to year to
detennine in their own interests what their salaries were to be. The fact that in the
tax years under review - and in previous years, it would seem - respondent received
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a salary which was much smaller than his income as a partner had been was again a
matter of his own choice, in consultation with his co-directors and co-shareholders. '
Subsequent to the incorporation of the company, but independently thereof, as the court
found, the credit loans having been exhausted, the company lent the shareholders large
sums of money out of its profits free of interest, and without security and without any
definite conditions of repayment. In the circumstances of the case it was held that the
directors' loans, seen in the context of the amounts allocated by way of salary and
dividends, were abnormal both as to the means or manner employed in granting them and
as to the rights and obligations created thereby.
From this case it can be concluded that the surrounding circumstances should be taken
into account in determining whether the transactions are considered abnormal. That is,
having regard to the circumstances, would the transaction be considered normal?
THE AMBIGUITY OF THE JUDGMENTS
From the above two cases it can be seen that the major difficulty with the normality test is
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circumstances.23
To assist in this problem it is worth looking at other decided cases on the issue of
abnormality.
In some earlier decisions, the court appeared to place some emphasis on whether a
transaction was one in common usage.
In ITC 963, Galgut J said the following: 24
'I should add that a taxpayer who changed his investments so as to have an
investment, the income from which is not taxable . . . is not indulging in an
abnormal transaction ... his conduct, or the transaction, is not in the court's view
abnormal. 1b.i.s is all the more so when we are told that this is a test case, which
indicates that several persons have entered into such transactions.'
(Emphasis added.)
23 See The Third Interim Report ofthe Commission ofInquiry into Certain Aspects ofthe Tax Structure of South
Africa (The Katz Commission) at 113.
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In ITC 1113,25 Watenneyer J used the concept of the actions of a 'normal businessman "
as a yardstick for assessing the nonnality of a transaction.
(Emphasis added.)
In Meyerowitz v cm, Beyer JA agreed with the judgment of the Special Court in which it
was stated that26
'the scheme was carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed
because, although the appellant was still doing the work and neither the trustee nor
his children were competent to assist in the production of The Taxpayer, it was not
the appellant but the trust that was made a partner. '
(Emphasis added.)
And in Smith v cm, Steyn CJ said the following: 27
'If the means and the manner are those normally employed ... and the rights and
obligations are those which would normally be created ... between persons dealing
at arm's length, the section would not apply even if, of a set purpose, a liability for
income tax is being avoided or postponed or the amount reduced.'
(Emphasis added.)
25 (1967) 30 SATC 8.
26 1963 (3) SA 863 (A), 25 SATC 287 at 296-7.
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From these passages it can be concluded that a normal transaction is one which is in
common usage. Therefore, presumably, if one adopts a common method of tax avoidance,
one can pass the normality test.
Two judgments have dealt with this issue, both of which have been severely criticised.
The first was that of COT v Ferera,28 where the Rhodesian Appellate Division decided
against the taxpayer.
The facts of this case are briefly that in 1952 the respondent formed a private company, P,
which acquired his shares in three trading companies. The P company was formed solely
to avoid death duties payable on the respondent's death and not to avoid the payment of
tax on undistributed profits or to reduce the liability of P's shareholders to super tax. In
accordance with the usual practice prevailing during the years of assessment in issue, the
P company distributed two-thirds of its profits and retained the remaining one-third, thus
avoiding payment of undistributed profits tax and reducing the liability of its shareholders
for supertax. In respect of the years of assessment ended 31 March 1967, 1968 and 1969
the Commissioner, invoking his powers under section 91,29 ignored the above mentioned
28 1976 (2) SA653 (RAD), 38 SATe 66.
29 Income Tax Act 5 of 1967(ofRhodesia), similar wording to the Republic section 103(1) before the introduction of
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retention of profits by P company and assessed the respondent as though he had received a
share thereof as dividends accruing to him and his wife in respect of their shareholding in
the company.
In his judgment Macdonald JP stated the following: 30
'Avoiding, postponing or reducing liability for tax is not in itself either a business or
trade since it is not in any way concerned with earning income but only with the
incidence of tax on income. It would be absurd to suggest that the legislature, in
attacking this evil, could possibly have intended to leave unscathed taxpayers who
frankly admit that the transaction, operation or scheme had as its sole or main
purpose the avoidance, postponement or reduction of tax. The only consequence of
such frank admission is that it is unnecessary in the light of it for the Commissioner
to base his decision to interfere upon circumstantial evidence. This is a conclusion
which arises by necessary implication from the terms of the section as a whole.
Clearly it was not the intention of the legislature to reward frankness with exemption
from the powers conferred by the section. It is equally absurd to suggest that the
legislature intended, as has sometimes been suggested, that taxpayers would not be
subjected to those powers if the means or the manner employed to avoid, postpone
or reduce tax was a means and manner normally employed for this purpose.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the section use the word "normally" in the context of
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transactions, operations or schemes which are supposedly or professedly business or
trading transactions, operations or schemes and not in the context of transactions,
operations or schemes which are admittedly not concerned with trade or business but
simply with avoidance, postponement or reduction of tax.'
(Emphasis added.)
It is evident from this judgment that a commonly used method of tax avoidance, which
lacks the characteristics of a business transaction, will not be considered normal for tax
purposes merely because of its regular use. This judgment seems to narrow the argument
of normality. It almost seems to indicate that once a taxpayer is shown to have entered
into a scheme for the purposes of tax avoidance, he will no longer have the defence of
normality, because no tax avoidance scheme can be normal.
This judgment has been criticised in South Africa. The Taxpayer stated that the31
'dichotomy between purpose and normality has ... been blurred almost to the point of
extinction', and that the interpretation put upon the section in this case is to 'stretch the
terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the effects of Parliament.' Broomberg states
that hardly any aspect of this judgment could be accepted as good law in South Africa. 32
31 (1976) 25 The Taxpayer at 169 and 170.
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The second case was ITC 1496. 33
In this case the taxpayer entered into a farming partnership as part of a so-called
plantation scheme. The scheme operated on the premise that interest due over a lengthy
period in the future could, by being settled immediately by way of promissory notes, be
deducted immediately. The other attraction of the scheme was that each participant would
benefit by claiming as a deduction a proportionate share of a management fee that was
payable in advance for the management of the farming activities necessary for the
operation of the scheme. To succeed with this claim, the taxpayer had to show that it was
a partner in a farming venture.
Melamet J held that the scheme was entered into and carried out in an abnormal manner,
which was outlined by the34 'artificial structure ... necessitated by the need to camouflage
investors as partners. '
Although there was consequently no need to decide whether the rights and obligations
created were abnormal in a partnership, Melamet J was able, effortlessly, to reel off
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seventeen abnonnalities, which, he indicated, were but part of a much larger population.
This case was also criticised for being35 'a clear example of the kind of judicial
intervention, probably last seen in the approach in Ferera v COT, 36 where Macdonald JP
said that "tax avoidance was an evil" which meant that the courts must not by
interpretation of the avoidance provisions deprive them of their efficiency. '
The Taxpayer in dealing with the comparison between the House of Lords' approach to tax
avoidance most recently expounded in Ensign Tankers Leasing Co Ltd v Stoke;? and that
developed in ITC 1496, commented as follows: 38
'Deciding this question in favour of the partnership, the court said that the question
was not why the taxpayer was trading but whether he was trading. If the sole
purpose of the transaction was to obtain a tax advantage, it was not logically possible
to postulate the existence of a conunercial purpose. However, it was possible to
have a situation in which a taxpayer, whose sole motive was the saving of tax,
invests with others in an ordinary trading activity conducted by them for a
conunercial purpose and with a view of making a profit. The court considered this
test to be an objective one. The adoption ofthis approach helps to prevent the court
35 See The Katz Commission Third Interim Report in paragraph 11.2.5.
36 1976 (2) SA 653 (RAD), 38 SATC 66 at 70.
37 (1989) 1 WLR 1222.
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from collapsing the distinction between abnormality and purpose in order to
conclude that it was not possible to have a genuine partnership once the purpose of
the partners was to save tax rather than conduct a trade. Once the requirements of
abnormality and purpose are distinguished, then it would appear that the Ensign
Tankers judgments have application in Southern Africa, that is, that the activities of
the partnership should be assessed objectively in order to decide whether the
partnership is truly engaged in a trading operation. '
The above was quoted in The Third Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (the Katz Commission), which
concluded as follows: 39
'As the Act is presently drafted, it is submitted that the Court's construction in the
aforementioned case [IrC 1496] does not provide a legally correct solution to a more
efficacious tax anti-avoidance provision and the criticism of The Taxpayer is
accordingly justified. '
The criticism indicates that these two cases went further than the legislation currently
stood and cannot therefore be seen as judicial precedent.
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in such a way that it has no resemblance to a business transaction, and is merely a tax
engineering device, it will be unlikely to pass the test of normality. On the other hand, if
the scheme is created and operated for the purpose of avoiding tax but conforms to an
established norm for the particular type of transaction, and is operated in the manner of a
normal business operation, it should pass the test of normality.
This conclusion veers towards new the 'business purpose' test, to be discussed in
Chapter C.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
There are two basic approaches to tax avoidance around the world, namely, the inclusion
of a provision in the tax legislation, and the law as developed through the cases.
The Katz Commission investigated a number of jurisdictions in order to evaluate
comparative legislation and case law to formulate the need for, and efficiency of, a general
anti-avoidance provision.40
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Those jurisdictions which have a general anti-avoidance provision are first discussed, and
then the United Kingdom approach of substance over form is discussed.
New Zealand
New Zealand Income Tax legislation contains a general anti-avoidance provision, which
provides the following: 41
'[E]very arrangement made or entered into ... shall be absolutely void as against the
Commissioner for income tax purposes if, and to the extent that, directly or
indirectly, its purpose or effect is tax avoidance.'
Therefore, tax avoidance need not be the sole or principal purpose, as long as it is not
merely an incidental purpose or effect. Once tax avoidance is proved, the section provides
that the Commissioner shall adjust the tax, as he considers appropriate, to counteract the
tax advantage.
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Australia
The South Mrican system was modelled on Australia's general anti-avoidance clause,42
which is similar to that of New Zealand. It provides that, upon meeting three
preconditions, a scheme may be assessed as though it was never effected. Essentially, the
requirements are as follows:
• a scheme;
• resulting in a tax benefit;
• entered into with the purpose of gaining such a tax benefit.
Eight alternative tests are provided to assist Revenue in deciding whether the scheme was
entered into for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit. These eight
tests are as follows: 43
'(a) The manner in which the scheme was entered into or carried out.
'(b) The form and substance of the scheme.
'(c) The time which the scheme was entered into and the period of time during
which the scheme was carried out.
'(d) The result which would be achieved by the scheme.
42 Part IVA ofthe Australian Income Tax Assessment Act.






THE IMPACT OF THE 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST ON SECTION 103(1)
'(e) Any change in the financial position of the relevant taxpayer arising out of
the scheme.
'et) Any change in the financial position of any other person.
'(g) Any other consequences for the relevant taxpayer or any other person
connected with him.
'(h) The nature of any connection between the relevant taxpayer and a person
contemplated by test (t).'
Interpreted literally, this legislation deprives the taxpayer of his choice in selecting the
most tax efficient route. In enforcing the law, however, Australian courts have determined
that, where the purpose of the total scheme or series of transactions is of a commercial
nature or is commercially justifiable, the anti-avoidance clause would not apply.44
This 'commercial purpose' could be likened to the South African 'business purpose', to be
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Hong Kong
The Hong Kong anti-avoidance legislation was also modelled on the Australian
legislation, and provides as follows: 45
'11Jis section shall apply where any transaction has been entered into or affected ...
and that transaction has ... the effect of conferring a tax benefit on a person. . . and,
having regard to-
(a) the manner in which the transaction was entered into or carried out;
(b) the form and substance of the transaction;
(c) the result in relation to the operation of this Ordinance that, but for this
section, would have been achieved by the transaction;
(d) any change in the fmancial position of the relevant person that has resulted,
will result, or may reasonably be expected to result, from the transaction;
(e) any change in the financial position of any person who has, or has had, any
connection (whether of a business, family or other nature) with the relevant
person, being a change that has resulted or may reasonably be expected to
result from the transaction;
(t) whether the transaction has created rights or obligations which would not
normally be created between persons dealing with each other at arm's length
under a transaction ofthe kind in question; and
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(g) the participation of the transaction of a corporation resident or carrying on
business outside Hong Kong;
it would be concluded that the person, or one of the persons, who entered into or
carried out the transaction, did so for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling the
relevant person, either alone or in conjunction with other persons, to obtain a tax
benefit.'
Once again, the application of the section has the effect of setting aside the transaction or
taxing it in the most appropriate manner.
Although the Hong Kong legislation goes a step further than the Australian legislation,
'the test for the manner in which the transaction was entered into does not appear to have
met the difficulties of the normality test of section 103(1). See in particular
paragraph (j). ,46
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Canada
Finally, the Canadian Legislation provides that47
'no disbursement which artificially reduces the income of a taxpayer shall be taken
into account in determining the tax liability; and
in computing income for the purposes of the Act no deduction may be made in
respect of a disbursement or expense made or incurred in respect of a transaction or
operation that ifallowed would unduly or artificially reduce the income. '
In interpreting the section, the Canadian court, in Stubart Investment v The Queen48
adopted a business purpose approach. (Emphasis added.)
Shortly after this case, the Canadian legislature introduced a general anti-avoidance rule
commonly known as gaar. Gaar basically states the following:
• A transaction or series of transactions which results directly or indirectly in a tax
benefit will be considered to be an avoidance transaction unless the transaction may
reasonably be considered to be undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide
purposes other than the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.
• Where a transaction is carried out for a combination of bona fide non-tax purposes
47 Section 137 of1he Canadian Income Tax Act.
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and tax avoidance, the primary purposes of the transaction must be determined.
• Where a transaction results in a tax benefit and has been carried out primarily for tax
purposes, gaar is only applicable if it may reasonably be considered that the
transaction or series thereof would result directly or indirectly in a misuse or abuse of
the particular provision.
Therefore gaar, essentially, relies upon the business purpose cum abuse of rights doctrine.
THE MARGO AND KATZ COMMISSIONS
Over the past ten years the South African government has requested two commissions to
investigate the question of tax avoidance. The first was The Report ofthe Commission of
Inquiry into the Tax Structure ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa (the Margo Commission) in
1986. The second, the Katz Commission, was a result of the Minister of Finance's 1995
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The Margo Commission
The Margo Commission adopted the view that anti-avoidance legislation was beneficial in
countering tax avoidance schemes and hence both general anti-avoidance measures and
specific provisions should be included within the South African legislation.49
It noted, however, that the normality requirement, to a large degree, pulled the teeth out of
section 103(1), among other reasons because, if a particular type of transaction is widely
used for tax avoidance purposes, it may gain a commercial acceptability to the extent that
its use becomes normal.
The Katz Commission
The Katz Commission proposal attempts to solve this problem by suggesting that, where
the transaction occurs in the normal business context, the normality test should be a
comparison to what is 'normal' for transactions of a similar nature.
This proposal was accepted by the legislature and enacted in 1996.
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CHAPTER C : THE NEW 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST
INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW LEGISLATION
Section I03(1)(b) - the 'nonnality' requirement now reads as follows:
'[H]aving regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or
scheme was entered into or carried out -
(i) was entered into or carried out-
(00) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the context of
business, in a manner which would not normally be employed for
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit;
and
(bb) in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme, being a
transaction, operation or scheme not falling within the provisions of
item (00) by means or in a manner which would not normally be
employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or
scheme in question; or
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at ann's length under a transaction, operation or
scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; ,
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divided into those, which apply 'in the context ofbusiness' , and those that do not.
Schemes applying 'in the context of business' must, in order to avoid meeting the
requirements of the extended section I03(1)(b)
• have a 'bona fide business purpose, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit'; and
• not create rights or obligations that would not normally be created between persons
dealing at arm's length under schemes of the kind in question.
Schemes that do not operate 'in the context of business' must, in order to avoid falling
within the requirements of section I03(1)(b), in the same way as prior to the extension
• not have been entered into or carried out in a manner not normal in relation to the
scheme in question; and
• not created rights or obligations that would not normally be created between persons
dealing at arm's length under schemes of the kind in question.
In applying the extended provisions the two new phrases that must be considered are
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'Business context'
There is no definition of the term 'in the context of business' and the phrase does not
appear to have been judicially interpreted.
The word 'context' has been judicially interpreted but only in relation to language and the
interpretation of statutes and rules. When used with reference to 'business' the only
dictionary definition which can realistically apply is that set out in Chambers 20th
Century Dictionary New Edition 1983 which gives the word 'context' the meanings
'associated surroundings' or 'setting'. Perhaps the most useful interpretation would be to
give the word 'context' (in the context of the phrase 'business context') the common sense
meaning of 'in relation to'. What does seem clear is that the phrase 'in the context of
business' is very wide-ranging and is likely to be so interpreted.
The word 'business' has been judicially defined as 'anything which occupies the time and
attention and labours of a man for profit'.50 In subsequent judicial considerations it has,
however, been suggested that the profit motive is not vital and that there appears to be no
definitive explanation of the word 'business'.
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There have been several cases dealing with the interpretation of the phrase 'carrying on
business' and it would be reasonable to suggest that the view adopted by the courts can be
sununarised by the dicta of Beadle CJ in Estate G v Commissioner ofTaxes, 51 which reads
as follows:
'The sensible approach, I think, is to look at the activities concerned as a whole, and
then ask the question: Are these the sort of activities which in commercial life,
would be regarded as "carry on business"? The principle features of the activities
which might be examined in order to determine this are their nature, their scope and
magnitude, their object (whether to make a profit or not), the continuity of the
activities concerned, if the acquisition of property is involved, the intention with
which the property was acquired. This list of features does not purport to be
exhaustive nor are any of these features necessarily decisive, nor is it possible to
generalise and state which feature could carry the most weight in determining the
problem. Each must depend on its own particular circumstances.'
It seems likely that in interpreting the word 'business' as used in the phrase 'business
context', the courts will adopt a similar approach.
No matter how general the interpretation may be, it could be difficult in some instances to
establish which schemes fall into the category of 'in the context of business'. For
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example, business type transactions entered into for domestic purposes, for example
domestic, private or family loans.
'Business purpose'
The phrase 'business purpose' has in itself not been subject to judicial interpretation.
On reading the amended section, it can be seen that when testing for the normality
requirement, the issue is not the taxpayer's purpose or intention of effecting a transaction
for bona fide business purposes. The criterion is merely whether the chosen transaction is
generally applied for business purposes. If so, he may freely declare having entered into
that transaction essentially for the purpose of gaining a tax benefit.
This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that if the reference point here was the
taxpayer's own purpose, there would be little or no difference between this test and the
subjective test as to the purpose.52 This distinction is important because there may be a
tendency to disregard this aspect and thus inadvertently allow the subjective test to
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contaminate what is clearly an objective nature test.
There can, therefore, be more than one 'normal' and non-tax motivated manner in which
any given transaction, operation or scheme may be entered into. If it can be shown that a
'reasonable business person' would have used the same manner as that employed by the
taxpayer, and would have done so (in those circumstances) for reasons other than a tax
benefit, the taxpayer's defence would not be obviated by the fact that there may have been
other valid, non-tax motivated manners or ways in which to have achieved the same end.
It would be going too far to suggest that a court would in each instance have to settle on
one exclusive manner as the most common, so that no other perfectly normal, totally non-
tax motivated (but perhaps less common) manner could serve as a reference for judging
the normality.
As with the subjective test as to the taxpayer's purpose, the test as to the manner must be
related to the full totality of the scheme, individual transactions within it, and sub-
combinations of transactions forming part of it - that is, in order to enjoy this defence,
generally the taxpayer would have to show the non-tax motivated normality as regards the
manner of the whole or any part of the transaction, operation or scheme.
In the new test, therefore, one has to separate out transactions done to achieve a business
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transaction, the two may be difficult to separate. In most cases the taxpayer's recourse
will lie directly in the purpose test in paragraph (c), as opposed to the normality test which
was generally used in the past.
COMPARISON TO THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT
Section 73 of the Value Added Tax Act provides that
, ... whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any scheme (whether entered into
or carried out before or after the commencement of the Act, and including a scheme
involving the alienation ofproperty):
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of granting a tax
benefit to any person; and
(b) having regard to the substance of the scheme;
(i) was entered into or carried out by a means or in a manner which
would not normally be employed for bona fide business purposes,
other than the obtaining of a tax benefit; or
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at ann's length; and
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the Commissioner must detennine the liability of any tax and the amount thereof as
if the scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the
circumstances of the case be deemed appropriate for the prevention or diminution of
such tax benefit. '
(Emphasis added.)
There has been only one case to date dealing with this section, Amor van Zyl Trust v
KBI. 53 Here the appellant contended that section 73(1) was not a tax-levying provision.
The case did not deal with the issue of the 'business purpose', and therefore this case
provides no assistance as regards the 'business purpose' test.
Section 73(1) is obviously an improvement on the old section 103(1) of the Income Tax
Act, and is worded in a similar way to the 'new' section 103(1), with the exception of the
use of the word 'substance' which does not appear in the 'new' section 103(1). This is a
significant omission, as will be seen in the discussions on substance over form.
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IMPACT OF BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST
The new 'business purpose' test adds some venom to section 103(1) against taxpayers,
particularly with regard to those who, in the past, used to reward tax avoidance of
enormous proportions.
Compared to the position in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, among others,
the South African taxpayer would still have the advantage of exercising his right to a tax
saving by entering into a transaction purely for tax purposes, but would have to ensure the
transaction is one normally applied for business purposes.
There is still a risk of the court reaching the point where it may decide 'enough is enough'
and take into account the taxpayer's own aim for entering into the transaction. The
court's decision could therefore reflect the fact that the transaction was, under the
circumstances, not entered into for business purposes.
Looking at the cases decided on normality in the past, the issue to be decided now is
whether the chosen transaction is generally applied for business purposes, or merely to
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In the case of Hicklin v SIR,54 it is unlikely that a nonnal businessman would sell a
dormant company to a dividend stripper for less than its net book value when he could
deregister the company himself at a small administrative cost and receive the full net asset
value. The only reason that a nonnal businessman would enter into a transaction of this
nature would be to avoid the tax payable on the deregistration dividend. It would seem
that, therefore, Hicklin would not succeed under the new business purpose test.
In the case of CIR v LOUW,55 one could conclude that a normal businessman would enter
into the series of transactions undertaken by Louw to incorporate a civil engineering
partnership. On the issue of the debit loan accounts, a nonnal businessman would not
reduce his salary in order to owe the company funds unless the purpose was the saving of
nonnal tax. The conclusions reached by the Appellate Division in Louw 's case would
remain unchanged with the introduction of the 'business purpose' test - that is - the
incorporation would not be regarded as abnonnal whereas the creation of the debit loan
accounts would be regarded as abnormal.
The other four cases56 basically conclude that a nonnal transaction is one in common
usage, even ifonly as a common method of tax avoidance. These decisions would alter on
54 The facts and decision ofthis case are detailed in Chapter B.
55 The facts and decision ofthis case are detailed in Chapter B.
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the basis that common usage would have to be a method that would be used by a normal
businessman for reasons other than the obtaining of a tax advantage.
The cases57 dealing with this issue of a common method of tax avoidance were both
criticised for going further than the legislation currently stood.
COT v Ferera seemed to steer towards the 'business purpose' test before its enactment. In
this regard Macdonald JP stated the following: 58
'Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the section use the word "nonnally" in the context of
transactions, operations or schemes which are supposedly or professedly business or
trading transactions, operations or schemes and not in the context of transactions,
operations or schemes which are admittedly not concerned with trade or business but
simply with avoidance, postponement or reduction oftax. '
(Emphasis added.)
A company's dividend policy is by its nature a matter of discretion, based on a number of
issues, only one of these being taxation. The retention of profits is not an abnormal way of
carrying on a business. On the contrary, it is quite normal for profits to be retained for
expansion, future expenditure and so on. In fact, the secondary tax on companies was
57 COT v Ferera and ITC 1496. The facts and decisions ofthese cases ace detailed in Chapter B.
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introduced into the Republic legislation specifically to encourage companies not to
distribute their profits. 59
What had to be decided in Ferera 's case was whether, under the circumstances, a normal
businessman would have retained one-third of the profits for reasons other than tax
avoidance. This issue was only briefly dealt with in the following phrase:60
'To retain the profits was, in the circumstances, an abnonnal way of transacting the
company's business.'
This issue is no longer difficult to decide. Different companies transact their businesses in
different ways and a company may well retain its profits for sound business reasons. It
would therefore seem that it is unlikely that the Conunissioner could prove that the
retained profits were not required in the business, and for this reason it is likely that this
case would succeed under the 'business purpose' test.
Again in the case of ITC 149661 it would have to be decided whether a normal
businessman would enter into the plantation scheme for reasons other than tax avoidance.
59 See the Budget speech for the 1993/94 financial year presented by the Minister ofFinance DL Keys on 17 March
1993.
60 COT v Ferera 1976 (2) SA 653 (RAD), 38 SATC 66 at 73.
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An example would be a high return on the 'investment'.
It could be argued that if the sole purpose of the transaction is to obtain a tax advantage, it
is not logically possible to postulate the existence of a conunercial purpose. This is not the
case, as it is possible to have a situation where a taxpayer, whose sole motive is the saving
of tax, invests with others in an ordinary-trading activity conducted by them for a
conunercial purpose and with a view of making a profit. As stated previously, when
testing for the normality requirement, the issue is not the taxpayer's own purpose but
merely whether the chosen transaction is generally applied for business purposes.
It is implied in the judgment that this would not be the case, and therefore the scheme
would not pass the 'business purpose' test.






THE IMPACT OF THE 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST ON SECTION 103(1)
CHAPTER D : SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
United Kingdom
British income tax legislation does not contain any general anti-avoidance clauses, and
therefore guidance must be sought from case law.62
For approximately forty years the English courts followed the approach adopted by the
House ofLords in IRC v Duke ofWestminster which stated the following: 63
'Every man is entitled ifhe can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be .... '
Then in 1981 in IRC v Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce laid down four general principles to be
applied to tax avoidance schemes, namely the following: 64
• When interpreting fiscal legislation, the courts are not confined to literal
interpretation. The taxpayer will be taxed according to the clear statutory words, but
the Act itself must be placed in context and the purpose of the Act should be taken
into account.
62 Refer to the Katz Commission Third Interim Report in paragraph 11.4.
63 51 TLR 467, 19 TC 490 at 520.
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• The taxpayer can arrange his affairs to reduce his liability to tax. He is still to be
taxed according to the legal effect of the transactions into which he has entered.
(Lord Wilberforce was here reaffirming the ratio of the Westminster decision.)
• The Courts should find as a matter of fact whether the transaction is a genuine one or
a sham.
• If the document or transaction is genuine, the court should not look for some
underlying substance (citing Westminster/is case). One should, however, not look at
the transaction distinct from its context; it may be an ingredient of a wider transaction
as a whole. When the Court is deciding whether the transaction is a genuine one or a
sham it may look at the series of transactions and determine their effect as a series. In
other words this constitutes a limit imposed by the Ramsay66 court on the Westminster
doctrine.
Ramsay's case concerned a scheme by means of which a series of loan and share
transactions were entered into for the purpose of manufacturing a paper loss to offset an
otherwise taxable gain on the sale of land. In this regard Lord Wilberforce said the
following: 67
65 IRC v Duke a/Westminster 51 TLR 467, 19 TC 490.
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'Given that a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go behind it so
some supposed underlying substance. This is the well known principle of IRe v
Duke of Westminster . ... This is a cardinal principle but it must not be overstated
or overextended. While obliging the court to accept documents or transactions,
found to be genuine, as such, it does not compel the court to look at a document or a
transaction in blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly belongs. It can
be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have effect as part of a nexus
or series of transactions, or an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole,
there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded: to do so is not to
prefer form to substance, or substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain
the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax
consequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of transactions,
intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded. '
A similar approach was applied in the Burmah Oir8 case, in which the House of Lords
was confronted by a series of transactions aimed at converting a bad debt by a subsidiary
into a loss on the winding-up of the subsidiary which would be tax deductible. The
House of Lords again looked through the transaction to what they perceived to be the real
transaction. In so doing, Lord Diplock warned that it would be dangerous to assume that
the Ramsay69 case did not make significant changes in the approach adopted by the
68 IRC v Burmah Oil CoLtd (1982] STC 301 (HL).
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House of Lords in dealing with a pre-ordained series of transactions, into which were
inserted steps having no commercial purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability for
tax, which, in the absence of those particular steps, would have been payable.
It was against this background, and relying on these authorities, that Lord Brightman
delivered his judgment in Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson.70 The facts in the
Dawson case were that the taxpayers in two manufacturing companies agreed to sell their
shares for £152 000. In order to defer the payment of capital gains tax, a scheme was
instituted whereby the shares in the two manufacturing companies were sold to
Greenjacket Investments (Pty) Ltd ('Greenjacket'), a company incorporated in the Isle of
Man. The consideration for the sale of the shares in the two manufacturing companies
was settled by the allotment of shares in Greenjacket to the taxpayers. Greenjacket then
sold the shares in the manufacturing companies to the ultimate purchaser for a cash sum
of £152 000. This £152000 cash then constituted the sole asset of Greenjacket. The
taxpayers were assessed for capital gains tax in respect of the disposal of the
manufacturing companies but the lower court upheld their appeal.
After a series of unsuccessful appeals by the Crown, the matter eventually came before the
House of Lords, which held the taxpayers liable to capital gains tax. The House of Lords
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criticised the reluctance of the judges in the lower courts to depart from the Duke of
Westminste/1 decision. Lord Bridge of Harwich remarked72 that the Duke ofWestminster
case still seemed to be authority for the proposition that only if the transaction were a
sham would it be legitimate to draw a distinction between substance and form in
considering the tax consequences of the transaction. He said, however, when moving from
a single transaction to a series of interdependent transactions designed to produce a given
result, it is perfectly legitimate to draw a distinction between the substance and the form of
the composite transaction without in any way suggesting that anyone of the single
transactions which makes up the whole is other than genuine.
His conclusion can be summed up by the following extract from the judgment:73
'My Lords, in my opinion the rationale of the new approach is this. In a pre-planned
tax-saving scheme, no distinction is to be drawn for fiscal purposes, because none
exists in reality, between (i) a series of steps which are followed through by virtue of
an arrangement which falls short of a binding contract, and (ii) a like series of steps
which are followed through because the participants are contractually bound to take
each step seriatim. In a contractual case the fiscal consequences will naturally fall to
be assessed in the light of the contractually agreed results .... Ramsay says that the
fiscal result is to be no different if the several steps are pre-ordained rather than pre-
71 IRe v Duke ofWestminster [1936) AC 1 (HL) 19.
72 At 535.
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contracted. For example, in the instant case, tax will, on the Ramsay principle, fall
to be assessed on the basis that there was a tripartite contract between the Dawsons,
Greenjacket and Wood Bastow under which the Dawsons contracted to transfer their
shares in the operating companies to Greenjacket in return for an allotment of shares
in Greenjacket, and under which Greenjacket simultaneously contracted to transfer
the same shares to Wood Bastow for a sum in cash. Under such a tripartite contract
the Dawsons would clearly have disposed ofthe shares in the operating companies in
favour ofWood Bastow in consideration of the sum of money paid by Wood Bastow,
with the concurrence of the Dawsons, to Gree~acket. Tax would be assessed, and
the base value of the Greenjacket shares calculated, accordingly. Ramsay says that
this fiscal result cannot be avoided because the pre-ordained series of steps are to be
found in an informal arrangement instead of a binding contract. The day is not saved
for the taxpayer because the arrangement is unsigned or contains the magic words
"this is not a binding contract" . . . . Secondly there must be steps inserted which
have no commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax
- not "no business effect". '
It can be seen that the attack was aimed at schemes characterised by a series of
transactions, in which some steps had no commercial purpose but were aimed simply at the
avoidance of tax.
From these rulings, the British courts have formulated the following principles on which
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Even though the person liable for tax may choose legally to manage his business in such a
way that he obtains maximum tax benefit for himself, the courts shall,
• first, upon interpreting the legislation, consider the purpose and scheme of the Act as
a whole; and
• secondly, shall have the right to, in a series of transactions, ignore the steps serving
no commercial purpose.
Thus, substance takes precedence over fonn.
South Mrica
There have been a few cases in South African law which have adopted a 'substance over
fonn' approach. The most significant was Commissioner of Customs and Excise v
Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd74 where the court followed an earlier judgment of Innes
Cl in Zandberg v Van Zyl.75
The facts ofRandles Brothers were briefly that the defendant imported goods and
74 1941 AD 369.
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transferred them to a manufacturer to be made up into shorts and pyjamas for the
defendant. Under the customs regulations that existed at the time, imported goods enjoyed
a customs rebate. In 1936 new regulations were promulgated requiring that in order that
the goods might enjoy a rebate the manufacturer to whom the importer transferred the
goods should make a declaration that the goods were his own property. The defendant,
with the intention of complying with these regulations, changed its procedure and sold the
goods to the manufacturer, and at the same time agreed to purchase the garments at the
price of the sum at which the goods had been sold, plus the cost of manufacture. The
goods were delivered to the manufacturer, who signed the appropriate form declaring that
the goods were his own property. When the manufacturer delivered the goods, he was
paid. The Commissioner of Customs and Excise contended that, notwithstanding the
procedure adopted by the defendant, the defendant remains at all times the owner of the
goods, and that it was liable to pay full duty upon the goods.
The Appellate Division found that the transaction between the company and the
manufacturer was genuine and that it was entitled to the customs rebate. Delivering the
judgment Watermeyer JA cited the following well-known passage from the judgment of
Iunes J in Zandburg v Van Zyl:76
'Not frequently, however (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the law
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would not give, or to escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose),
the parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal its real character. They call it by a
name, or give it a shape, intended not to express by disguise its true nature. And
when a court is asked to decide any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so
by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not what in form it purports to be ..
. But the words of the rule indicate its limitations. The court must be satisfied that
there is a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated
intention. For if the parties in fact mean that a contract shall have effect in
accordance with its tenor, the circumstances, that the same object might have been
attained in another way will not necessarily make the arrangement other than it
purports to be. The enquiry, therefore, is in each case one of fact, for the right
solution ofwhich no general rule can be laid down.'
Commenting on this passage Watenneyer lA in Rand/es, Brothers & Hudson Ltd said the
following: 77
'A transaction is not necessarily a disguised one because it is devised for the purpose
of evading the prohibition in the Act or avoiding liability for the tax imposed by it.
A transaction devised for that purpose, if the parties honestly intend it to have effect
according to its tenor, is interpreted by the courts according to its tenor, and then the
only question is whether, so interpreted, it falls within or without the prohibition of
tax.
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'A disguised transaction in the sense in which the words are used above is
something different. In essence it is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, in as much
as the parties to it do not really intend it to have, inter partes, the legal effect which
its terms convey to the outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by
concealing what is the real agreement or transaction between the parties. The
parties wish to hide the fact that their real agreement or transaction falls within the
prohibition or is subject to the tax, and so they dress it up in a guise which conveys
the impression that it is outside the prohibition or not subject to the tax. Such a
transaction is said to be in fraudem legis and is interpreted by he courts in
accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or transaction between the
parties.
'Of course, before the court can [md that a transaction is infraudem legis in the
above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit
understanding between the parties.'
The court found that the consequences of the arrangement between the company and the
manufacturer were fully intended and that ownership did pass. In other words, both parties
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The approach of the South African Appellate Division in Randles, Brothers & Hudson
Ltd78 is completely different from that of the House ofLords in Furniss (Inspector o/Taxes)
v Dawson.79 In the Dawson case, the House of Lords accepted that the transactions
between the parties were completely genuine; the parties intended the transactions to have
full effect in accordance with the tenor of the agreement. There was no suggestion of a
(
'tacit' or an 'unexpressed' agreement between the parties. The House of Lords was
concerned to set aside the transaction only on the basis that it made no commercial sense
other than avoiding tax. In Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd on the other hand, the
Appellate Division was at pains to point out that if the parties genuinely arranged their
affairs to avoid tax then the courts would not interfere. Only if the parties purported to
enter into one transaction, whereas in reality and by tacit understanding they were entering
into a completely different transaction, would the courts assail the disguised transaction.
In Zanc/berg v Van Zyl,80 Innes Cl held that, where the court is satisfied that the real
intention of the parties could be ascertained and that it differed from the simulated
intention, the court would give effect to the real agreement. In Randle Brothers the court
accepted the principle that a transaction that was in reality devised to avoid liability for tax
imposed could be classed as being in/raudem legis, so that 'the transaction is interpreted
78 41 AD 369.
79 (1984) STC 153 (HL).
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by the courts in accordance with what is found to be the real agreement or transaction
between the parties'. 81 On the facts, however, the court found that the parties honestly
intended to give effect to the legal consequences as set out in the agreement and that on
the evidence there was a clear intention to transfer ownership.
Some other cases dealing with 'substance over form' are now discussed.
In CIR v Saner,82 a case bearing certain similarities to the Dawson case, the shareholders
in a company wished to sell the assets of the company and also to avoid tax on the profits
derived from the sale, that would have to be distributed by way of a dividend. Accordingly
the company sold its undertaking to a new company in consideration for shares in the new
company. The shares in the new company were then sold to the four directors at a low
price. They, in turn sold the shares in the new company to the ultimate purchaser at a
proper market price. The four directors then distributed the proceeds of the final sale
amongst the shareholders of the original company. The Commissioner assessed Saner,
one of the four directors, to tax upon a quarter of the profits derived from the proceeds of
the second sale. The court held that the various transactions should be regarded as a
whole and therefore the transaction was in substance a realisation of the assets of the
81 Zandburg v Van Zyl1910 AD 302 at 396.
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original company for the benefit of its shareholders.
Tindall J, in delivering judgment in Saner's case, said the following;83
'The substance and not the fonn of the transaction must be looked at .... [I]n my
opinion the facts stated by the Special Court in the present case show that neither the
intention to sell to Saner and his associates nor a genuine purchase price were
present. As was pointed out by De Villiers JA in McAdams v Fiander's Trustee and
Bell (1919 AD 207 at 224), there can be no contract of purchase and sale without the
animus emendi on the part of the purchaser and the animus vendendi on the part of
the seller, and it must be a genuine animus of the one to sell and of the other to buy.
It is not enough for the parties to think that they have the intention; the intention
must be proved as a fact apart from what they thought and the price must be real and
serious.'
In essence, the transaction has to be genuine; that is, the parties have to intend the
consequences on which they purported to agree. In other words, in Saner's case, although
the transaction was described as a sale, the consequences of a sale were never intended; the
true understanding between the parties was in fact something other than that expressed in
the true transaction.
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In ITC 26084 the taxpayer carried on one business, and a second business was purportedly
carried on in the name of his son. The taxpayer sought to deduct a bad debt, being an
amount lent by him to his son. On an examination of the situation, however, the court
came to the conclusion that there was, in essence, only one business and that was carried
on by the taxpayer. His son was merely working under his supervision and had no real
interest in the so-called second business. The amount was therefore deductible, not as a
bad debt owed by the other business, but as a loss incurred in the overall business of the
taxpayer.
This case should be compared to ITC 463,85 a case in which the taxpayer sold his shares to
a third party for £2 000 in cash and also resigned as managing director of the company. In
consideration for the resignation, the company undertook to make a payment to him of £25
per month for ten years. Despite the ambiguity of the wording of the arrangement and the
fact that payments were made on a periodic basis, the court examined the real nature of the
transaction and found that the payment was made for the taxpayer's 'ceasing to have an
interest in the company'.86 The court found that, although the monthly payment had the
external appearance of an annuity, it was in fact nothing more than a portion of the
principal sum, being the consideration payable to the taxpayer for his sale of his entire
84 (1932) 7 SATC 73.
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interest in the company.
On the other hand in ITC 333,87 a lump-sum payment received for the cancellation of an
agency agreement was found to be a 'commutation of the monthly income to which the
company was entitled under the agreements' and a substitution for that income.
A good example of the court's looking to the underlying relationship between the parties,
rather than the form of the transaction, is ITC 124.88 In this case the taxpayer, a partner
in a business, entered into a deed of sale in terms of which the business was sold to a new
partnership. A major proportion of the consideration for the sale was allocated to he
transfer of the leasehold rights to certain premises. The taxpayer's capital account in the
new partnership, of which he was also a member, increased as a result of the value placed
on the leasehold rights. The Commissioner sought to tax the increase in the value of the
leasehold rights on its disposal from the old partnership in the hands of the taxpayer, but
the court found that the taxpayer held the same interest in both partnerships, that there had
been no disposal of his interest in the leasehold rights to a third party and that no
consideration had been received in respect of the transfer of the leasehold rights. The
transaction amounted, as far as the taxpayer was concerned, simply to a revaluation of his
87 (1935) 8 SATC 333.
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interest in the partnership.
In ITC 43689 a taxpayer was the owner of two properties, both of which were let to a
company of which the taxpayer was the principal shareholder. The Commissioner
adopted the attitude, amongst other things, that the taxpayer and the company were one
and the same person. The court refused to pierce the corporate veil and found, that to do
so 'would be to ignore the distinction between the appellant and the company as separate
personae. The court cannot possibly ignore such a distinction. The company, as a
separate persona, is the tenant of the appellant in his individual capacity' .90 It was
recognised that the transaction between the taxpayer and his company was a genuine
transaction. The consequences were fully intended, there was no reason to suppose that
the lease was a disguise or a sham and there was, underlying the transaction of lease, some
other tacit or other unexpressed arrangement. The validity of the lease and the separate
corporate identity of the company were therefore upheld.
In Baily v CIR91 there are some striking similarities the Dawson92 case. Bailey, a
financier, expected to receive large profits from his interest in the BM Association. These
profits would clearly have been taxable in his hands and, in an attempt to avoid the tax, he
89 (1939) 10 SATC 453.
90 At 454.
91 1933 AD 304, (1934) 6 SATC 69.
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formed a separate company, to which he sold his interest in the HM Association for
£7750. This amount was the par value of the shares that had been allotted to him on the
formation of the company. The price for the issue of the shares and the consideration for
the sale of the interest in the HM Association were then offset. The profits from the HM
Association were distributed in due course to the company, which was placed under
voluntary liquidation, and the profits were distributed to Bailey by way of a non-taxable
liquidation dividend. The Commissioner sought to tax these dividends and the Appellate
Division upheld this assessment, finding that the liquidation dividends were not receipts of
a capital nature and were properly included in Bailey's gross income.
The court explained93 that the mere fact that the amounts were called 'liquidation
dividends' did not necessarily prove that they were of a capital nature. In order to decide
whether they were of a capital nature it had to be determined, in effect, what the real
transaction between the appellant and Bryanston (prop) Limited was. The court found
that it was not reasonable to conclude that the appellant intended to sell his valuable rights
in the HM Association for £7 750. The scheme was a single and indivisible transaction;
its true nature was a sale in consideration of the allotment to the appellant of all the shares
in the company, which would hold precisely the same interests previously held by the
appellant in the HM Association, and by means of which shares the appellant hoped to be
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able to receive the profits of the HM Association in an indirect manner, thereby escaping
taxation. It was found that the shares so acquired from the company could in no sense be
regarded as an investment of capital, nor could the proceeds of those shares, 'the
liquidation dividends', be regarded as a return of capital.
In both Bailey4 and Dawson95 the courts ignored the interposition of a company. In
Dawson the court taxed the Dawsons as if Greenjacket Investments (Pty) Ltd had never
existed and in Bailey the court acted similarly. It is interesting, however, to note the
difference in approach between the courts. In Dawson the court said that, although the
transaction was completely genuine and fully intended, it had no purpose other than tax
avoidance and since the whole structure was directed at that end, it had to be struck down.
In Bailey the court adopted the view that the transaction had never really been intended.
The sale of Bailey's interest in the association to the company had been a fiction, the lack
of an appropriate consideration clearly weighing heavily with the court.
It is clear from an analysis of the court's reasoning that, if Bailey had sold his interest for
a reasonable amount and had not immediately wound up the company to take out the
profits, the transaction might have succeeded in avoiding liability for tax. Yet, in Dawson,
94 Baily v CIR 1933 AD 204, (1934) 6 SATe 69.





THE IMPACT OF THE 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST ON SECTION 103(1)
where the sale was for true value and the shares in Greenjacket Investments (Pty) Ltd were
not immediately disposed of, the House of Lords nevertheless taxed the Dawsons directly.
In two similar cases ITC 2e6 and ITC 69097 the taxpayer contended that the true
transaction was something other than that recorded in the agreements. In both cases that
taxpayer has purchased assets, including goodwill, as well as rights under a lease. In both
cases the taxpayer contended that the payment for goodwill was not, in fact, truly a
payment for goodwill but should be regarded as a lease premium, which would have been
deductible. In neither case did the taxpayer succeed. The courts found no reason to
suppose that the agreements did not correctly reflect the intention of the parties.
Another important decision in the field of substance versus form is that of the Appellate
Division in cm v Collins. 98 Here, a company decided to increase its capital and in so
doing it capitalised undistributed profits of £16 000, issuing them as bonus shares to its
existing shareholders. The Commissioner sought to levy tax on the shares that had been
so issued as bonus shares on the basis that this was simply a distribution of profits. Iunes
Cl reasoned as follows: 99
'The profits referred to were vested in the company; no member could claim any
96 (1922) 1 SATC 206.
97 (1950) 16 SATC 503.
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portion of them; but the shareholders could by resolution compel their distribution as
dividends. They resolved not to exercise that power, but authorised the conversion
of the amount into share capital, - the resulting shares to be distributed on a
specified basis. And the directors, representing the company, gave effect to that
resolution .... But if we have regard to the real substance of what was done there
was no intention on the part of the company to distribute any portion of assets, nor
did any such distribution take place . . . . The transaction was to my mind whole and
indivisible, - the capitalisation of profits covered by the issue of shares representing
those profits ... The governing facts are that the company never intended to part
with the profits, and that the shareholders never obtained any right to them. That
was the substance of transaction, and I agree with Rowlatt J thinking that the means
employed to carry it out were machinery only; they cannot affect the character of the
capitalised profits. '
The Appellate Division held, therefore, that the issue of the bonus shares was not intended
as a guise for the distribution of profits in a non-taxable form. The company and the
shareholders could elect either to capitalise the profits or to distribute them as dividends.
There was no reason to suppose that the election to capitalise the profits and issue shares
was in any way not a genuine transaction that did not reflect the true intention of the
parties. On the contrary, there were sound commercial reasons to support the election that
had been made. It should be noted, however, that although the court took the commercial
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ground but on the proposition that there were two routes open to the parties and they had
validity and intentionally chosen a route which had specific tax consequences.
More recently the courts have looked at the substance of a series of interrelated
transactions to determine the true intention of the parties.
A recent case dealing with this issue is the Appellate Division case of Er! 3183/1
Ladysmith (Ply) Ltd and Another v CIR. 100
The case deals with a scheme designed to use the benefits of section 11(f) in respect of
lease premiums without creating gross income in the hands of the lessor (under
paragraph (h». The facts of the case were briefly, that a company in a group owned land
that it wished to develop. The land was let to a pension fund that erected the buildings
thereon, and sublet the land and buildings to another company in the group that paid an
up-front lease premium. This was done before section 11(f) was amended to require a
deductible lease premium to be taxable in the lessor's hands. The pension fund enjoyed an
exemption from normal tax in terms of section 10 while the sub-lessee obtained a
section 11(f) deduction.
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Relying on the principle that '[e]very man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs in such
a way that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than otherwise would be' ,101
the appellant's counsel argued that effect must be given to the agreements according to
their terms despite their underlying purpose.
The Commissioner's argument was based on the principle that was succinctly explained
by Wessels ACJ in Kilburn v Estate Kilburn as followS: 102
'Courts of law will not be deceived by the fonn of a transaction: it will rend aside
the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and examine its true nature and
substance. '
The Commissioner argued that the documents did not reflect the real intention of the
contracting parties because the entire purpose of the transaction was to evade tax. The
agreements were concluded in a form that concealed the fact that the appellants did have
the right to have the buildings erected. He argued that the entire purpose of the
transaction was to evade tax.
The court in this case was faced with arguments from opposing parties that were based on
101 Per Lord Tomlin in IRC v Duke ofWestminster 1963 (A) 1 at 19. This principle was adopted by Centlivres CJ in
hisrninority judgment in CIR v Estate Kholer and Others (1953 (2) SA 584 (A) at 59lE - 592H and affmned in
subsequent judgments ofthe Supreme Court.





THE IMPACT OF THE 'BUSINESS PURPOSE' TEST ON SECTION 103(1)
two well-known legal principles. The interaction between these two principles was
referred to by Lord Russell of Killowen in the Duke of Westminster's case when he said
the following:103
'Ifall that is meant by the doctrine is that having once ascertained the legal rights of
the parties you may disregard mere nomenclature and decide the question of
taxability or non-taxability in accordance with the legal rights, well and good .... If,
on the other hand, the doctrine means that you may brush aside deeds, disregard the
legal rights and liabilities arising under a contract between parties, and decide the
question of taxability or non-taxability upon the footing of the rights and liabilities of
the parties being different from what in law they are, then I entirely dissent from
such a doctrine. '
In the South African case of Dadoo Lld and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council,
Iunes Cl said the following: 104
'[A] transaction is infraudem legis when it is designedly disguised so as to escape
the provisions of the law, but falls in truth within these provisions. Thus stated, the
rule is merely a branch of the fundamental doctrine that the law regards the
substance rather than the form of things - a doctrine common, one would think, to
every system of jurisprudence and conveniently expressed in the maxim plus valet
quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.'
103 IRC v Duke ofWestminster [1963J AC 1 at 25.
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In the Ladysmith case Hefer lA in referring to the two principles said the following: 105
'Provided that each item is confmed to its recognised bounds there is no reason why
both principles cannot be applied in the same case. I have indicated that the court
only becomes concerned with the substance rather than the form of a transaction
when it has to decide whether the party concerned has succeeded in avoiding the
application of a statute by an effective arrangement of his affairs. Thus applied, the
two principles do not conflict. '
Hefer lA quoted sections from the judgments in Zandburg v van Zyll06 and Commissioner
of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd107 in order to reveal the
fundamental flaw in a submission that tinged the entire argument for the appellants. The
following quote from the case is of relevance: 108
'I have quoted the relevant passages from the leading cases in full in order to reveal
the fundamental flaw in a submission which tinged the entire argument for the
appellants. It is to the effect that, once it is found that the parties to the present
agreements actually intended to structure their arrangement in the form of a lease
coupled with a sub-lease and a building contract, there is really an end to the matter,
because in that event effect must be given to each agreement according to its tenor.
This is plainly not so. That the parties did indeed deliberately cast their
105 Er!3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd andAnother v CIR 1996 (3) SA 942 (A), 58 SATe 229 at 239.
106 1910 AD 302 at 309.
107 1941 AD 369 at 395-6 and at 58 SATC 239.
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arrangement in the form mentioned, must of course be accepted; that, after all, is
what they have been advised to do. The real question is, however, whether they
actually intended that each agreement would inter partes have effect according to its
tenor. If not, effect must be given to what, the transaction really is. I must also
point out that, by virtue of the provisions of section 82 of the Act, the burden to
prove that any amount is exempt from tax and the duty to show that the
Commissioner's decision to disallow their objection to the assessments was wrong,
rest on the appellants . . . . Therefore, unless the appellants have shown on a
preponderance of probability that the agreements do indeed reflect the actual
intention of the parties thereto, the Commissioner's decision cannot be disturbed.
Apart from the agreements themselves the only evidence placed before the Special
Court on this part of the case was that of the two witnesses referred to earlier. The
question is whether this is sufficient to discharge the onus.
'Regarded separately and without reference to the others, there is nothing unusual
about the terms of the main leases or of any of the other documents except for one
remarkable feature. Since the same signatories signed the main leases, the sub-
leases and the building contracts simultaneously on behalf of the appellants, the
Fund, Pioneer and the contractor respectively, we must infer that they signed each
agreement with full knowledge ofthe terms of the others which were either awaiting
their signature or had already been signed. In view of the terms of the variation
agreements the signatories must have known full well that the main leases did not
correctly reflect the arrangement in respect of the payment of rent for the period 1
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relevant tenus had to amended or why there had to be separate docwnents. I am
unable to accept the suggestion put forward by the appellants' attorney that the
variation agreements might have been prepared simply to correct a mistake by the
draughtsman. There is no reason to asswne in appellants' favour that a mistake had
been made and it is in any event highly unlikely that additional documents, replete
with definitions and recitals and running into three pages each, would have been
prepared instead of redrafting a few lines in the leases. It is significant that payment
of rent was in effect suspended in the variation of agreements until 1 August 1984
which was the date on which the sub-leases would commence and the day after the
buildings were expected to be completed under the building contract. But this only
becomes clear once all the agreements are read together: a reader who was not aware
of the existence ofthe variation agreements would not know that the Fund would not
be paying rent for the first four months. This he could only discover upon being
shown the variation agreements; and even then he would be unaware that the reason
for the apparent indolence was that the buildings would only be completed at the end
of the fourth month. The impression is irresistible that the parties sought to give to
each agreement a semblance of self-sufficiency which it did not in reality possess.
'Be that as it may, the agreements cannot be regarded separately; they were all
signed simultaneously and were plainly interdependent to the extent that none of
them would have been concluded unless all the others were also signed; as
appellants attorney conceded, each one must be considered in the context of all the
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Hefer JA then concluded that the nature of the agreements was such that all of the parties
must have clearly understood what was really intended.
The following quote from the judgment is telling:109
'Can it in these circumstances be said, particularly taking account of what I have
said about the appellants' interests in the terms of the sub-leases relating to the
erection of the buildings, that as a matter of probability the directors intended to
confer the sole right to have the buildings erected on Pioneer, thereby precluding the
appellants from taking steps to enforce compliance with the relevant terms? In my
view not. I have no doubt that the directors were aware of the need for the
appellants to protect their own interests themselves. There is a real likelihood that
there was an unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the appellants
and Pioneer that the appellants would be entitled if need be to enforce compliance
with the relevant terms of the sub-leases, either against Pioneer or possibly against
Pioneer and the Fund jointly. Of this the Fund could not have been unaware: as
stated earlier, it could not have been kept in the dark about the purpose of its
intervention; indeed, on the available evidence, there is no reason to believe that the
Fund was not unaccustomed to the role it was required to play in this kind of
transaction. On this basis the Fund too could well have been a party to the
agreement or understanding referred to. The evidence does not exclude what is thus
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a real likelihood that the written agreements do not reflect the true and full
intentions of the parties. Appellants' entire case rests on the provisions of clause 7.1
of the main leases. However, it is those very provisions that, on the aforegoing
analysis, bear the stamp of simulation. The purpose could well have been to conceal
the real or complete terms of what the parties truly intended but chose not to
express.'
The court held that the substance of the transaction was merely a lease between the lessor
and the sub-lessee and ignored the insertion of the pension fund. The lessor was taxed in
terms of paragraph (h) of the definition of 'gross income' on the value of the
improvements. The court then found it unnecessary to examine the Commissioner's
alternative grounds under section 103(1).
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
It would be incorrect to conclude that the court had infused the Republic's law with the
English 'substance over form' approach. Instead the court applied itself to the real
intention of the parties to a series of contracts, this application having been derived from
an examination of the written agreements as read together and the purpose for which these
agreements were entered into. In this, the judgment derives its justification from
principles of the Republic's law of contract. This distinction between, on the one hand,
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fonn can be fine. Where the substance of the transaction is different to the sum of the
parts, the court should accept the reality of the transactions (they are not shams) but
consider whether their cumulative effect is such that, in substance, they make up a
different transaction for income tax (and indeed commercial) purposes.
The test of the commercial rationale for the transaction is perhaps the safest approach for
the determination of the tax effect of any transaction. For this reason the actual intention
of the parties as opposed to a 'constructed' disguise by means of written agreements will
be the key determinant of the nature of the transaction. From the true nature of the
agreements, a taxpayer can determine whether rights that accrue have been created. It is
here that the true significance of the Ladysmith judgment must be located.
Another recent judgment dealing with lease premiums was ITC 1606 delivered by
Tebbutt J in the Cape Special Court.no
The facts were that a transport company wished to acquire new premises for one of the
group's operating companies - the appellant - as the existing premises were too small.
The land was acquired by a third party property broker (H), a dealer in property, who
developed the premises to the taxpayer's specifications. In order to finance the acquisition
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of the property and its development, H raised a loan of RI,65 million from a bank. A
bond secured the loan over the property. In addition guarantees were given by the
shareholder of the appellant's holding company and his three sons. The premises were let
by the broker to the taxpayer for a period of eight years with a lease premium of RI,5
million payable up front and an annual rental of RI 000. In order to pay the lease
premium the appellant borrowed RI,65 from the same bank. The broker used the lease
premium to settle its indebtedness to the bank and as a result the bond was cancelled. The
bare dominion was then sold to a sister company of the taxpayer for R502 000.
It should be noted that the total cost of the land and improvements was approximately
R2 million. Approximately four to five years later the property was sold for R4, I million
as the appellant was no longer doing well and wished to move to smaller premises.
The taxpayer claimed a deduction, in terms of section I l(/), of the premium paid over the
period of the lease. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction in terms of
section 103(1) against which the taxpayer appealed.
'H' was taxed on the lease premium as well as the bare dominion sale proceeds. Being a
speculator, it was also able to deduct the costs of acquisition. Had the broker not been
interposed the property-owing company would have been taxed on the lease premium
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third party broker.
The court noted that there were four preconditions laid down in section 103(1) and that all
four had to be fulfilled before the Commissioner could apply the provisions of the section.
They were as follows:
• The transaction or scheme must lead to tax avoidance, reduction or postponement.
• It must be entered into or carried out wholly or mainly for the purposes of avoidance,
reduction or postponement of tax.
• It must be entered into or carried out in a way which would not normally be used in
carrying out such a transaction or scheme.
• Rights or obligations must be created which would not normally be created between
parties acting at arm's length.
The court observed that, in order to determine the purpose of a particular agreement, it
was necessary to look at the subjective intent of the parties at the time the agreement was
entered into and that, in so far as the present transaction was concerned, it was clearly to
reduce tax. The central question was therefore whether the transaction was one that would
normally be entered into between persons acting at arm's length.
A distinction must be drawn between an unusual transaction and an abnormal one and it is
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through the medium of a scheme, it will be unusual but the abnormality of the scheme will
usually depend on whether it creates rights or obligations which would not normally be
created by the parties to the transaction.
Where a scheme consists of separate transactions, which together in substance make up
one composite transaction, it would be artificial only to look at each independent step and
not have regard to the transaction as a whole.
After reviewing the issues in broader perspective, Tebbutt J, President of the Special
Court, returned to the facts at hand and said that it appeared from those facts that,
although the scheme was made up of three separate steps, each one of which could be seen
as genuine, it was clear that they were all parts of one composite transaction. It was also
clear that although there were three entities with independent legal personalities, two of
them took part as members of a single company group and the third acted purely as an
agent for that group in the transaction.
Tebbutt J was of the view that!!!
'where H was brought into the picture purely to give effect to the reduction of tax,
the transaction should be seen in its entirety, in our view, as not normal or arm's
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length'.
Although the evidence was that the group's chief purpose was to procure suitable premises
for the taxpayer's business, the scheme which was actually entered into was, however, not
to acquire the properties but was so constructed as to give effect to a tax reduction and,
therefore, the scheme's chief purpose was to reduce tax.
He then went on to say, after discussing the United Kingdom case of Furniss v Dawson,
'[A]lthough the opinion has been expressed that any principle flowing out of the
Furniss case should not be adopted by our courts (see article by Anton Derkson in
August 1990 South African Law Journal at 416) the learned author of that article
nonetheless indicates that the thought process in the Furniss case is in line with the
statutory anti-avoidance provisions of the South African Act. In the light of this, it
is our opinion that conunon sense holds that when one of the transactions included in
a series of transactions, has no conunercial purpose, and is there exclusively to
attempt to obtain a tax advantage, it cannot be seen as a normal transaction between
persons acting at arm's length.'
(Emphasis added.)
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This conclusion appears to steer towards the 'business purpose' test by disregarding
transactions with no commercial (business) purpose other than the obtaining of a tax
benefit.
Another case involving a leasehold improvement scheme along the lines of the scheme in
Ladysmith was Relier (Ply) Lld v CIR. ll3 This is an appeal against the judgment in the
Special Income Tax Court (ITC 1611).114
The facts were that Hollard (H) who owned a computer company (EDP) sold two vacant
stands to the appellant, Relier (Pty) Ltd (a dormant company belonging to a provident
fund (the Fund». Relier let the property to the provident fund, which was included in the
arrangement because its income was exempt from tax in terms of section 11(d) of the
Income Tax Act. The lease was for a minimum period of ten years. The rental during the
initial and any extended period amounted to RI 750 a month, which represented a return
of21% on RIOO 000.
The property had to be used for the erection of office buildings, the buildings had to be
insured by the tenant, the insurance policy had to be ceded to Relier (Pty) Ltd and the
113 60 SATC 1.
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tenant had to pay all expenses concerning the property. The tenant was not entitled
without the prior consent of Relier to sublet or make structural alterations or additions and
at the termination of the lease all improvements were to become the property of Relier
without any compensation.
The Fund lent Relier R100 000 to pay for the purchase of the properties. The loan bore
interest at 21%, equivalent to the rentals received by Relier.
The Fund sub-let the properties to EDP and although identical to the main lease in most
respects, it differed in that there was an obligation on EDP to effect improvements to the
property costing not less than R820 000. At the termination of the sublease the
improvements were to become the property of Relier, without any compensation.
The effect of this was that because the amount of interest and rentals were the same, no
rentals flowed between Relier and the Fund. EDP's rental payment was in effect the
interest payment on the loan.
The RlOO 000 lent by the Fund to Relier to pay H was then 'pledged' by H to the Fund and
this amount had to be invested for the benefit of H. It was to be released once the loan had
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Although Relier became the owner of the property, it was the intention that this would be
a temporary arrangement and an option was granted to the H Family Trust to purchase all
the shares in Relier at their nominal value.
What he parties sought to achieve was a tax deduction of the cost of the building in EDP
in terms of section ll(g) of the Act without a corresponding gross income inclusion in
terms of paragraph (h).1I5 Relier would obtain the building as a capital gain without any
tax liability because neither the Fund nor EDP had any contractual obligation towards it to
erect the building. The H Family Trust would eventually hold the shares in Relier, and
therefore the property including the improvements.
Alerted to the arrangement by a note to Relier's annual financial statements the
Commissioner taxed an amount of R988 425 in Relier's hands. (It is not clear how the
Commissioner arrived at this amount.)
Relier objected to the inclusion of this amount on the ground that no right accrued to it to
have the improvements effected to its land as contemplated in paragraph (h) of the 'gross
income' definition. In terms of the agreements the right to have improvements effected to
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the property accrued to the Fund.
The issue before the court a quo and the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether the value
of this right had accrued to Relier in terms of paragraph (h) of the 'gross income'
definition.
The Special Court concluded that the scheme had not been entered into to be 'tax driven',
but rather that 'the impelling consideration of the transactions was not to avoid or reduce
tax but to enable EDP and the trust, both controlled by Hollard, to acquire the use and then
the ownership of a property with a building on it in what was conceived to be a tax
efficient way. It was the structure of the transactions that was designed to achieve a
favourable tax result' .116
Wunsh J, President of the Special Court, said the following: 117
'It is not the function of our courts to remedy or augment the power of the legislature
to counteract tax avoidance. We do not have the weapons to counter-act
parliamentary inaction or ineptitude or to avoid parliamentary congestion.
It is common cause that the transactions were interdependent and that none of them
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would have been concluded without the others. We have rejected the submission
that there were tacit terms in the sense of what are also sometimes called implied
terms to be added to the agreements. What we have to examine is what the actual
(even if not all recorded) terms of the agreement of lease between the taxpayer and
the provident fund were. Did the lease confer the taxable right on the taxpayer?'
The Special Court concluded as follows: 118
'We conclude, therefore, that the appellant had a right, which accrued during the
year of assessment, to compel the provident fund to procure the erection of a
building on its property to a value of at least R820 000, that this right fell within the
ambit of para (h) and that the respondent correctly assessed the appellant to tax on
its value.'
It was against this decision that an appeal was lodged.
In the Supreme Court of Appeal Harms JA, who delivered the unanimous judgment of the
court, noted that the issue in the present instance was not whether the scheme fell foul of
section 103(1), but whether Relier had established, on a balance of probabilities, that the
building costs were not part of its gross income because no right had accrued to it, in
terms of an agreement relating to the grant to any other person of the right of use or
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occupation of the land, to have improvements effected on the land by that other person.
The taxpayer's representative argued that because the scheme was structured with full
knowledge of the tax provisions and since the parties intended not to attract tax, there
could be no question of a simulated agreement or of unexpressed terms. Re had made the
same submission in the Ladysmith case where Refer lA responded as follows: 1l9
'That the parties did indeed deliberately cast their arrangement in the form
mentioned, must of course be accepted; that, after all, is what they have been
advised to do. The real question is, however, whether they actually intended that
each agreement would inter partes have effect according to its tenor.'
Re summarised the main conclusions of Refer lA in the Ladysmith case as follows: 12o
'In the main this court concluded that although the law permits people to arrange
their affairs so as to remain outside the provisions of a particular statute including a
taxing provision, the question in the end remains whether the arrangement was one
of substance and not one of form. More to the point, it was held that parties cannot
arrange their affairs through or with the aid of simulated transactions and effect will
be given to unexpressed agreements and tacit understandings.'
119 Ladysmith (Ply) Ltd andAnother v CIR 1996 (3) 942 (A), 58 SATC 229 at 240.
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Harmes JA observed that121
'[i]f the agreements are taken at face value, the appeal must succeed. The
interposition of the Fund as tenant and lessor, however, has unusual and unreal
aspects to it and the question that immediately springs to mind is whether the Fund
actually intended to lease and then to sublet the property.
'It was readily conceded that the Fund never had the intention to use the property as
tenant by occupying it or otherwise. To rent in order to sublet is not unusual in
itself, but one would have expected that in such circumstance some advantage would
accrue to the tenant. In this case there was none. The rental received by the Fund
from EDP was the same as the rental payable by the Fund to Relier, which in turn
was equal to the interest due by Relier to the Fund. All the obligations of the Fund
as tenant were, according to the sublease, placed upon EDP. The Fund had no
interest in the increase in the value of the property, whether in its capacity as tenant,
sublessor or as sole shareholder of Relier.'
He went on to say the following: 122
'The Fund, in fact, incurred obligations which one would not have expected a trustee
(Anderson) to have entered into. One such was the warranty given to Holloway
concerning the tax effectiveness. In addition, in terms of the option, Relier was no
longer effectively under the control ofthe Fund because Relier could no longer be
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involved in any business beyond that agreed with Holloway.
'The Fund, as sublessor, imposed a contractual obligation upon EDP to erect a
building to the value ofR820 000, not on its own behalf, but in the sole interests of
Relier. No other reason for the term was suggested. Relier, the owner of the
property and the Fund's landlord, who, in terms of the scheme was not supposed to
have any interest in the imposition of the obligation upon the subtenant, EDP, stood
surety for the loan incurred by EDP to erect the building and passed a surety
mortgage bond over its property. As was the case in the Special Court, "[n]o basis
was suggested on which, bearing in mind their fiduciary duties, the directors of the
appellant could have undertaken this liability without a corresponding obligation on
the part of the principal debtor (EDP), which had no contractual nexus with the
appellant, to improve the appellant's property which could be enforced, directly or
indirectly, by the appellant." 123
'Holloway, a pivotal figure in the scheme, did not understand what the scheme
involved and was thus a party to agreements, the import of which escaped him.
From this one can fairly deduce that the written agreements did not reflect his true
intentions. Nevertheless, the effect of the considerations mentioned is that the
interposition of the Fund as tenant was not truly intended and amounted to a
simulation. They also lead me to conclude that Relier had an enforceable right to
have the improvements effected in terms of and as set out in the sublease. It is
inconceivable in the scheme of things that the parties intended that Relier could not
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enforce the obligation incurred by EDP. Ifone poses the question whether the Fund
and EDP could have cancelled or amended the obligation to erect a building by
agreement without the consent of Relier, the answer must perforce be in the
negative. Similarly, it is unthinkable that the Fund could have elected not to enforce
the obligation of EDP to erect without the permission of Relier. The submission by
Mr Vorster that since the Fund controlled Relier this could not happen does not take
account of the fact that a taxpayer must accept the consequences of the separate legal
personalities involved. '
As a result the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the Commissioner had correctly
assessed the taxpayer to tax on the value of its right to compel the Fund to procure the
erection of a building on its property within the ambit of paragraph (h) of the definition of
'gross income'.
Harmes JA flatly rejected any attempt by the appellant to distinguish the facts in Relier 's
case from those in the Ladysmith case. In this regard he stated the following: 124
'An attempt was made to distinguish the present facts from those in Ladysmith.
have some difficulty in appreciating how the differences endure to the benefit of the
appellant. ill any event, the effect of my conclusion set out earlier is that the
Commissioner's case in case is stronger than what it was in Ladysmith. '
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The appeal was dismissed with costs.
It is clear from this case and from the Ladysmith case that the courts are going to view
schemes of this nature with a more critical eye than they might have done in the past.
Both the Relier and Ladysmith cases provide significant support for the following
statement made by Silke: J25
'As regards disguised transactions entered into for the purpose of tax evasion, the fiscus is
sufficiently protected by common law, in that a court will not hesitate to strip the transaction
of its disguise and expose the true nature or substance of the contract. '
The case of CIR v Cactus Investments (Ply) Ltd/26 deals with interest but there is an
element of Wunsh's judgment that deals with the true intentions of the parties.
The case dealt with interest dividend swaps. In terms of the arrangement Cactus (a
taxpayer) ceded its right to interest income (which would have been taxed in its hands) to
tax exempt entities in return for a cession by the tax-exempt entities of their right to tax-
free dividends.
125 Silke on South African Income Tax 11 MemEd in §19.i.
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Wunsch J cited a number of cases dealing with the issue and concluded as follows: 127
'In the present case the respondent did not enter into an agreement to acquire
dividends on shares selected by it. It did not receive the dividends "of its choice".
The choice of the dividends was left entirely to the institutions and they made their
elections shortly before the cessions had to be effected, i.e. on the construction which
I place on the agreement, before payment was to be made.
Applying Zandberg v Van Zyl,128 the court has to determine what the actual intention
of the parties was, taking into an account "all the circumstances", which must
include the method used by the parties to implement the master agreements. In
Lawson & Kirk v SA Discount (Pty)129 Davis J said:
"But the court has to determine the true meaning and intent of this covering contract,
which took the outward form of an arrangement for purchases and sales, by what was
said at the time and subsequently, and by what is of greater importance, namely what
was done under it. Above all, what sorts of contracts were entered into in pursuance
of this general covering agreement? It will consequently be necessary to examine the
different types of contract purported to have been entered into under the original
covering agreement, and in great measure to judge its true nature by them."
'Although his judgment was a dissent as to the outcome of the appeal, I consider that
the approach of our courts with regard to ineffective transactions was correctly stated
by De Wet Cl in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers and
127 CIR v Cactus Investments (Pty) Ltd 59.SATC 1 at 42-3.
128 1910 AD 302 at 310.
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Hudson Ltd130 indicating that dishonesty does not have to be present for a pwported
agreement to be regarded as simulated or a sham, when he said, after citing a
passage from a judgment ofDe Villiers AJA in MacAdam v Flander's Trustee: l3l
"I think the learned judge intended to emphasise in the last sentence that, if the court
on a consideration of all the circumstances comes to the conclusion that the
transaction was not what it pwported to be, it follows that however honestly the
parties thought hat their intention was in accord with the simulated transaction, that
was not their real intention."
'The quoted word of De Villiers AJA included the following:
"Parties may honestly think that they are entering into a contract of purchase and
sale, which turns out to be one of pledge. Whether it is the former depends upon
whether the essential elements of such a contract are present. To go back to fIrst
principles. There can be no contract ofpurchase and sale without the animus emendi
on the part of the purchaser and the animus vendendi on the part of the seller. And it
must be a genuine animus of the one to sell and of the other to buy. It is not enough
for the parties to think that they have the intention, the intention must be proved as a
fact apart from what they thought."
'An example of the application of this approach is Tucker v Ginsberg, where the
court was concerned of the question whether the discounting of a bill of exchange
was a money lending transaction. Trollip J said: 132
130 1941 AD 369.
131 1919 AD 207 at 383.
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"As each party has given the transactions a different label, I think that it is
appropriate to add here that the label used is not decisive. Despite the label, the
court must look at the nature of the transaction and not its object because, as stated
above, the object is the same in both cases - see Olds Discount Co Ltd v John
Play/air Lld [1938] 3 All ER 275 at p 277, and in ascertaining its nature the court
must have regard mainly to its substance and not merely its form.'"
'In the present case the respondent was not prepared to look exclusively to the rights
to the dividends for payment of the consideration for the rights to the interest - the
institutions were clearly the primarily obligors. The cession were, to adopt the
expression used in the American Restatement supra, used as "a device" for the
settlement of the monetary obligations to the respondent. lfthe dividends ceded to it
failed to materialise, others had to be substituted. Similarly the institutions looked
to the respondent for payment and the cessions of rights to interest were used as a
device for the settlement of the monetary obligations ofthe respondent.
'On the basis of the above reasoning it was put to Mr Solomon that the true
transaction between the parties to each of the agreements was reciprocal
undertakings to pay each other money amounts which they were to implement by
transferring to each other interest and dividends respectively.'
When this contention was accepted by council for the respondent 'that was the end of the
respondent's case' according to Wunsh J.
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intention, of the parties.
A recent Eastern Cape Special Court decision133 also deals with the issue.
In this case, the taxpayer wished to raise R95 750000 for future capital expansions. The
most obvious way to secure the necessary funds would be to obtain a loan from a financial
institution. As the amount involved was substantial, the bank required security. It was
not an option to offer income-producing assets as security, as the assets would have had to
be in the possession of the plegee for a pledge to be valid. From a tax point of view the
transaction was not beneficial to either the borrower or lender, as the borrower could only
deduct the interest payable on the loan, in tenns of section 11(a), and not the repayment of
the loan itself, while the lender would be taxed on the interest received, as it is part of its
gross income.
An alternative route was for the taxpayer to sell some of its income-producing assets to the
financial institution and then to lease them back. For the seller the scheme did involve a
risk that the ownership of the assets would pass to the financial institution with the effect
that, if the latter went insolvent, the assets will fall into its insolvent estate. This was,
however, not much of a risk as,
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• first, the chances of a reputable financial institution going insolvent were slight and.
• secondly, the purchase price of the goods, which are sold at market value, was paid in
cash.
The tax consequences of the sale and leaseback route, unlike the loan, were that the full
rental expenditure - that is, the interest and capital portion - was deductible in the hands
of the lessee. Although the rentals received were taxable in the hands of the financial
institution, a depreciation allowance conld be claimed under section 11(e) of the Act. As a
result of this allowance, the rental charged was based on the lower interest rate than it
would have been under a conventional loan.
This particular method of financing is no longer viable as a result of the amendments




the taxpayer decided to follow the sale and lease back route as the present
value of the after-tax lease versus the loan benefit, at a discount rate of 18% a year, was
R29 247 796.
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The agreements between the parties were carefully recorded. The sale agreement was
made subject to the suspensive condition that the seller and buyer enter into a lease
agreement. The parties thus did not conceal the fact that the two transactions were
interrelated. Due to the high cost involved in appointing an independent valuer, an
employee of the taxpayer was appointed to identify and value the assets that were to be
sold. It was not only important for the seller that the assets were sold at market value, but
also for the purchaser, as the section ll(e) allowance was based on the market value.
The lease agreement provided that if the Commissioner did not accept the purchase price
as the basis on which the allowance might be claimed, the rental would be adjusted
upwards to compensate the financial institution.
On the day the agreements were signed, representatives of both the seller and the
purchaser proceeded to the seller's factory where, in the presence of an attorney, delivery
took place by way ofconstitutum possessorium, the exercise of which was recorded by the
attorney in a notarial certificate.
The Commissioner questioned the validity of the scheme on the following two grounds:
• First, that the transactions were simulated, and
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Kroon J, President of the Special Court, approached the question of simulation on the
premise that the sale and lease back transaction should be construed as a single composite
transaction. It was decided that the transaction was not disguised, as both parties agreed
on the assets to be sold and a genuine price was paid. One party had the true intention to
buy and the other party the true intention to sell.
Although some of the assets that were sold formed an integral part of the taxpayer's
manufacturing process, without which it could not operate, these were sold subject to the
buyer leasing them back to it. The fact that the bank had not seen the plant and
machinery until legal delivery (by constitutum possessorium - i.e. a legal, not a physical
handing over of ownership, because the assets stayed in the possession of the taxpayer),
was not an issue.
Even though, for accounting purposes a sale and leaseback transaction is treated as a
finance lease, this treatment is not decisive in determining the tax treatment. For
accounting purposes the financial and economic substance of an agreement is taken into
account and not the legal form of the contract. For tax purposes, the legal form of the
transaction is taken into account unless it is proved that the transactions were a sham.
Having established that the contracts reflect the true intentions of the parties, Kroon J
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of section 103(1) had been complied with, a transaction had been entered into; the effect of
which was to reduce tax.
The transactions were, however, not abnormal, either in the means or manner in which
they were entered into or carried out, nor in terms of the rights or obligations that they
created.
The court also found that the sole or main purpose of entering into the arrangement was
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The applicability of substance over form in South Mrica
It is not generally accepted that the substance over form doctrine should be adopted in
South African law. Two examples where the form of a transaction is recognised over its
substance are as follows:
• Finance leases - the substance of the transaction is the acquisition of ownership of the
asset, however, the lessor and the lessee are taxed on the form of the transaction, that
is a lease.135
• Sale and leaseback transactions - the substance of the transactions is that the sale
proceeds are in effect loans on the security of assets and the lease instalments are in
effect repayment of the loans. The introduction of section 23D in the Income Tax
Act, to limit the deduction of allowances by financiers in sale and leaseback
situations, would not have been necessary if the substance of the transaction was the
basis for the imposition of tax. 136
It is submitted that, if substance is the basis for assessment, the enactment of section
103(1) would not have been necessary. Section 103(1) was enacted, and amended,
135 Lessors are taxed in terms ofsection 23A ofthe Income Tax Act which clearly supports form over substance.
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because the basis of assessment is that the fonn of the transaction predominates.
Had the legislature intended this, the word used in section 103(1) would be 'substance', as
is the position in section 73 of the Value Added Tax Act.m
The South African courts are, however, steering towards the United Kingdom doctrine of
substance over fonn as a basis for their decisions, although the English decisions have
gone much further.
The United Kingdom approach, which culminated in the decision in Dawson 's case138, is
that where a series of transactions has been entered into with the purpose of avoiding tax,
and some of the steps in the series have no commercial purpose other than the avoidance
of tax, then that entire series of transactions may be disregarded and the 'true substance'
may be invoked.
The South African courts, on the other hand, have adopted the view that, if a transaction is
genuinely intended, and if the parties truly intend the rights and obligations which flow
from the agreement or for agreements actually to exit, the court would have no reason to
137 Refer Chapter B.
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go behind the 'form' of the transaction, even if invited to do so by the taxpayer, because
the form and the substance in that instance would be one and the same. It is only where
the court suspects that there may be an underlying, unexpressed or secondary agreement or
intention and that the formal agreement is intended merely as a cover for the real
agreement, that the courts may strip away the fa~ade in order to discover the nature of the
real agreement.
It has been stated that '[i]n essence, it would seem that the intention of the "business
purpose" test is to look at the substance of a transaction, or series of interrelated
transactions rather than the simple form' .139
It is submitted, however, that this overstates the position of the South African courts and
that, although the lack of a commercial purpose may be an indication that the 'formal
agreement' does not truly reflect the 'real agreement', this cannot be elevated to a
principle of law and should be regarded as no more than one of many factors which the
court would take into account.
In conclusion the so-called substance over form doctrine is not of direct relevance in South
African tax avoidance other than in establishing the true intention of the parties.
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Basically, where there is no business purpose for a particular transaction other than the
obtaining of a tax advantage, that transaction will be ignored for tax purposes giving effect
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CHAPTER E : CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the introduction of the 'business purpose' test gives more venom to the
Court under section 103(1)(b) - the normality test.
Page 104
It assists in preventing taxpayers from using the defence that a common method of tax
avoidance, which gains commercial acceptance, is normal. Compared to the position in
the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, among others, the South African taxpayer
still has the advantage of exercising his right to a tax saving by entering into a transaction
purely for tax purposes, as long as it is one normally applied for business purposes and as
long as it is not regarded as a sham transaction.
The 'business purpose' test does not go as far as to favour the substance of a transaction,
or series of interrelated transactions, over their simple form. Where, however, the
circumstances indicate that there is abnormality, it will be of assistance to look at the
substance of the transaction over its form in order to determine the true intention of the
parties.
In essence, where there is no 'business purpose' for a particular transaction other than the
obtaining of a tax advantage, that transaction should be ignored for tax purposes giving
effect to the overall 'substance' of the scheme.
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